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Abstract
In this paper, we study the adversarial attack and defence problem in deep learning
from the perspective of Fourier analysis. We first explicitly compute the Fourier
transform of deep ReLU neural networks and show that there exist decaying but non-
zero high frequency components in the Fourier spectrum of neural networks. We
demonstrate that the vulnerability of neural networks towards adversarial samples
can be attributed to these insignificant but non-zero high frequency components.
Based on this analysis, we propose to use a simple post-averaging technique to
smooth out these high frequency components to improve the robustness of neural
networks against adversarial attacks. Experimental results on the ImageNet dataset
have shown that our proposed method is universally effective to defend many
existing adversarial attacking methods proposed in the literature, including FGSM,
PGD, DeepFool and C&W attacks. Our post-averaging method is simple since it
does not require any re-training, and meanwhile it can successfully defend over
95% of the adversarial samples generated by these methods without introducing any
significant performance degradation (less than 1%) on the original clean images.
1 Introduction
Although deep neural networks (DNN) have shown to be powerful in many machine learning tasks,
researchers (Szegedy et al., 2013) found that they are vulnerable to adversarial samples. Adversarial
samples are subtly altered inputs that can fool the trained model to produce erroneous outputs. They
are more commonly seen in image classification task and typically the perturbations to the original
images are so small that they are imperceptible to human eye.
Research in adversarial attacks and defences is highly active in recent years. In the attack side, many
attacking methods have been proposed (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014; Papernot
et al., 2016a; Papernot et al., 2017; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Kurakin et al., 2016; Madry et al.,
2017; Carlini and Wagner, 2017a; Chen et al., 2017; Alzantot et al., 2018; Brendel et al., 2017),
with various ways to generate effective adversarial samples to circumvent new proposed defence
methods. However, since different attacks may be more effective to different defences or datasets,
there is no consensus on which attack is the strongest. Hence for the sake of simplicity, in this work,
we will evaluate our proposed defence approach against four popular and relatively strong attacks
for empirical analysis. In the defence side, various defence mechanisms have also been proposed,
including adversarial training (Rozsa et al., 2016; Kurakin et al., 2016; Tramèr et al., 2017; Madry
et al., 2017), network distillation (Papernot et al., 2016b), gradient masking (Nguyen and Sinha,
2017), adversarial detection (Feinman et al., 2017) and adding modifications to neural networks (Xie
et al., 2017). Nonetheless, many of them were quickly defeated by new types of attacks (Carlini
and Wagner, 2016, 2017b,c,a; Athalye et al., 2018; Athalye and Carlini, 2018; Alzantot et al., 2018).
Madry et al. (2017) tried to provide a theoretical security guarantee for adversarial training by a
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min-max loss formulation, but the difficulties in non-convex optimization and finding the ultimate
adversarial samples for training may loosen this robustness guarantee. As a result, so far there is no
defence that is universally robust to all adversarial attacks.
Along the line of researches, there were also investigations into the properties and existence of
adversarial samples. Szegedy et al. (2013) first observed the transferability of adversarial samples
across models trained with different hyper-parameters and across different training sets. They also
attributed the adversarial samples to the low-probability blind spots in the manifold. In (Goodfellow
et al., 2014), the authors explained adversarial samples as "a result of models being too linear, rather
than too nonlinear." In a later paper, Papernot et al. (2016) showed the transferability occurs across
models with different structures and even different machine learning techniques in addition to neural
networks. In summary, the general existence and transferability of adversarial samples are well
known but the reason of adversarial vulnerability still needs further investigation.
In general, the observation that some small imperceptible perturbations in the inputs of neural net-
works lead to huge unexpected fluctuations in outputs must correspond to high frequency components
in the Fourier spectrum of neutral networks. In this paper, we will start with the Fourier analysis of
neural networks and elucidate why there always exist some decaying but nonzero high frequency
response components in neural networks. Based on this analysis, we show neural networks are
inherently vulnerable to adversarial samples due to the underlying model structure and why simple pa-
rameter regularization fails to solve this problem. Next, we propose a simple post-averaging method
to tackle this problem. Our proposed method is fairly simple since it works as a post-processing
stage of any given neural network models and it does not require to re-train neural networks at
all. Furthermore, we have evaluated the post-averaging method against four popular adversarial
attacking methods and our method is shown to be universally effective in defending all examined
attacks. Experimental results on the ImageNet dataset have shown that our simple post-averaging
method can successfully defend over 95% of adversarial samples generated by these attacks with
little performance degradation (less than 1%) on the original clean images.
2 Fourier analysis of neural networks
In order to understand the behaviour of adversarial samples, it is essential to find the Fourier transform
of neural networks. Fortunately, for some widely used neural networks, namely fully-connected
neural networks using ReLU activation functions, we may explicitly derive their Fourier transform
under some minor conditions. As we will show, these theoretical results will shed light on how
adversarial samples happen in neural networks.
2.1 Fourier transform of fully-connected ReLU neural networks
As we know, any fully-connected ReLU neural networks (prior to the softmax layer) essentially form
piece-wise linear functions in input space. Due to space limit, we will only present the main results
in this section and the proofs and more details may be found in Appendix.
Definition 2.1. A piece-wise linear function is a continuous function f : Rn −→ R such that there
are some hyperplanes passing through origin and dividing Rn into M pairwise disjoint regions Rm,
(m = 1, 2, ...,M), on each of which f is linear:
f(x) =

w1 · x x ∈ R1
w2 · x x ∈ R2
...
wM · x x ∈ RM
Lemma 2.2. Composition of a piece-wise linear function with a ReLU activation function is also a
piece-wise linear function.
Theorem 2.3. The output of any hidden unit in an unbiased fully-connected ReLU neural network is
a piece-wise linear function.
This is straightforward because the input to any hidden node is a linear combination of piece-wise
linear functions and this input is composed with the ReLU activation function to yield the output,
which is also piece-wise linear. However, each region Rm is the intersection of a different number of
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half-spaces, enclosed by various hyperplanes in Rn. In general, these regions Rm (m = 1, · · · ,M)
do not have simple shapes. For the purpose of mathematical analysis, we need to decompose each
region into a union of some well-defined shapes having a uniform form, which is called infinite
simplex.
Definition 2.4. Let V = {v1,v2, ...,vn} be a set of n linearly independent vectors in Rn. An
infinite simplex, R+V, is defined as the region linearly spanned by V using only positive weights:
R+V =
{
n∑
k=1
αkvk
∣∣∣∣ αk > 0, k = 1, 2, · · · , n
}
(1)
Theorem 2.5. Each piece-wise linear function f(x) can be formulated as a summation of some
simpler functions: f(x) =
∑L
l=1 fl(x), each of which is linear and non-zero only in an infinite
simplex as follows:
fl(x) =
{
wl · x x ∈ R+Vl
0 otherwise
(2)
where Vl is a set of n linearly independent vectors, and wl is a weight vector.
In practice, we can always assume that the input to neural networks, x, is bounded. As a result, for
computational convenience, we may normalize all inputs x into the unit hyper-cube, Un = [0, 1]n.
Obviously, this assumption can be easily incorporated into the above analysis by multiplying each
fl(x) in eq.(2) by
∏n
r=1 h(xr)h(1−xr) where h(x) is the Heaviside step function. Alternatively, we
may simplify this term by adding n2 additional hyperplanes to further split the input space to ensure
all the elements of x do not change signs within each region R+Vq . In this case, within each region
R+Vq , the largest absolute value among all elements of x is always achieved by a specific element,
which is denoted as rq . In other words, the dimension xrq achieves the largest absolute value inside
R+Vq . Similarly, the normalized piece-wise linear function may be represented as a summation of
some functions: f(x) =
∑Q
q=1 gq(x), where each gq(x) (q = 1, 2, · · · , Q) has the following form:
gq(x) =
{
wq · x h(1− xrq ) x ∈ R+Vq
0 otherwise
For every Vq , there exists an n× n invertible matrix Aq to linearly transform all vectors of Vq into
standard basis vectors ei in Rn. As a result, each function gq(x) may be represented in terms of
standard bases V∗ = {e1, · · · , en} as follows:
gq(x) =
{
w¯q · x¯q h(1− 1 · x¯q) x¯q ∈ R+V∗
0 otherwise
where x¯q = xATq , and w¯q = wqA
−1
q .
Lemma 2.6. Fourier transform of the following function:
s(x) =
{
h(1− 1 · x) x ∈ R+V∗
0 otherwise
may be presented as:
S(ω) =
( −i√
2pi
)n n∑
r=0
e−iωr∏
r′ 6=r
(ωr′ − ωr) (3)
where ωr is the r-th component of frequency vector ω (r = 1, · · · , n), and ω0 = 0.
Finally we derive the Fourier transform of fully-connected ReLU neural networks as follows.
Theorem 2.7. The Fourier transform of the output of any hidden node in a fully-connected unbi-
ased1 ReLU neural network may be represented as
∑Q
q=1wqA
−1
q ∇S(ωA−1q ), where∇ denote the
differential operator.
1For mathematical convenience, we assume neural networks have no biases here. However, regular neural
networks with biases may be reformulated as unbiased ones by adding another dimension of constants. Thus,
the main results here are equally applicable to both cases. Note that regular neural networks with biases are used
in our experiments in this paper.
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Figure 1: Illustration of input space divided into sub-regions by a biased neural network. The black
lines are the hyperplanes for the first network layer, while the blue lines are for the second layer and
the red lines are for the third layer. A small perturbation from point A to point B may possibly cross
many hyperplanes.
Obviously, neural networks are the so-called approximated bandlimited models as defined in (Jiang,
2019), which have decaying high frequency components in Fourier spectrum. Theorem 2.7 further
shows how the matrices A−1q contribute to the high frequency components when the corresponding
region R+Vq are too small. This is clear since the determinant of Aq is proportional to the volume
of R+Vq in R
n. As we will show later, these small regions may be explicitly exploited to generate
adversarial samples for neural networks.
2.2 Understanding adversarial samples
As shown in Theorem 2.3, neural network may be viewed as a sequential division of the input
space into many small regions, as illustrated in Figure 1. Each layer is a further division of the
existing regions from the previous layers, with each region being divided differently. Hence a neural
network with multiple layers would result in a tremendous amount of sub-regions in the input space.
For example, when cutting an n-dimensional space using N hyperplanes, the maximum number
of regions may be computed as
(
N
0
)
+
(
N
1
)
+ · · · + (Nn). For a hidden layer of N = 1000 nodes
and input dimension is n = 200, the maximum number of regions is roughly equal to 10200. In
other words, even a middle-sized neural network can partition input space into a huge number of
sub-regions, which can easily exceed the total number of atoms in the universe. When we learn a
neural network, we can not expect there is at least one sample inside each region. For those regions
that do not have any training sample, the resultant linear functions in them may be arbitrary since
they do not contribute to the training objective function at all. Of course, most of these regions
are extremely small in size. When we measure the expected loss function over the entire space,
their contributions are negligible since the chance for a randomly sampled point to fall into these
tiny regions is extremely small. However, adversarial attacking is imposing a new challenge since
adversarial samples are not naturally sampled. Given that the total number of regions is huge, those
tiny regions are almost everywhere in the input space. For any data point in the input space, we
almost surely can find such a tiny region in proximity where the linear function is arbitrary. If a point
inside this tiny region is selected, the output of the neural network may be unexpected. These tiny
regions are the fundamental reason why neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial samples.
In layered deep neural networks, the linear functions in all regions are not totally independent. If we
use v(l) to denote the weight matrix in layer l, the resultant linear weight wk in eq.(2) is actually the
sum of all concatenated v(l) along all active paths. When we make a small perturbation ∆x to any
input x, the fluctuation in the output of any hidden node can be approximated represented as:
∆f(x) ∝ N ·
∏
l
E
[
|v(l)ij |
]
(4)
where N denotes the total number of hyperplanes to be crossed when moving x to x+ ∆x. In any
practical neural network, we normally have at least tens of thousands of hyperplanes crossing the
hypercube Un = [0, 1]n. In other words, for any input x in a high-dimensional space, we can always
move it to cross a large number of hyperplanes to enter a tiny region. When N is fairly large, the
above equation indicates that the output of a neural network can still fluctuate dramatically even after
all weight vectors are regularized by L1 or L2 norm.
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At last, we believe the existence of many unlearned tiny regions is an intrinsic property of neural
networks given its current model structure. Therefore, simple re-training strategies or small structure
modifications will not be able to completely get rid of adversarial samples. In principle, neural
networks must be strictly bandlimited to filter out those decaying high frequency components in order
to completely eliminate all adversarial samples. We definitely need more research efforts to figure
out how to do this effectively and efficiently for neural networks.
3 The proposed defence approach: post-averaging
3.1 Post-averaging
In this paper, we propose a simple post-processing method to smooth out those high frequency
components as much as possible, which relies on a simple idea similar to moving-average in one-
dimensional sequential data. Instead of generating prediction merely from one data point, we use the
averaged value within a small neighborhood around the data point, which is called post-averaging
here. Mathematically, the post-averaging is computed as an integral over a small neighborhood
centered at the input:
fC(x) =
1
VC
∫
· · ·
∫
x′∈C
f(x− x′) dx′ (5)
where x is the input and f(x) represents the output of the neural network, and C denotes a small
neighborhood centered at the origin andVC denotes its volume. When we choose C to be an n-sphere
in Rn of radius r, we may simply derive the Fourier transform of fC(x) as follows:
FC(ω) = F (ω)
1
VC
∫
· · ·
∫
x′∈C
e−ix
′·ω dx′ = F (ω)
Γ(n2 + 1)
pi
n
2
Jn
2
(r|ω|)
(r|ω|)n2 (6)
where Jn
2
(·) is the first kind Bessel function of order n/2. Since the Bessel functions, Jν(ω), decay
with rate 1/
√
ω as |ω| → ∞ (Watson, 1995), we have FC(ω) ∼ F (ω)
(r|ω|)n+12
as |ω| → ∞. Therefore,
if r is chosen properly, the post-averaging operation can significantly bandlimit neural networks by
smoothing out high frequency components. Note that the similar ideas have been used in (Jiang et al.,
1999; Jiang and Lee, 2003) to improve robustness in speech recognition.
3.2 Sampling methods
However, it is intractable to compute the above integral for any meaningful neural network used in
practical applications. In this work, we propose to use a simple numerical method to approximate it.
For any input x, we select K points in the neighborhood C centered at x, i.e. {x1,x2, · · · ,xK} , the
integral is approximately computed as
fC(x) ≈ 1
K
K∑
k=1
f(xk). (7)
Obviously, in order to defend against adversarial samples, it is important to have samples outside
the current unlearned tiny region. In the following, we use a simple sampling strategy based on
directional vectors. To generate a relatively even set of samples for eq.(7), we first determine some
directional vectors vˆ, and then move the input x along these directions using several step sizes within
the sphere of radius r:
x′ = x+ λ · vˆ (8)
where λ = [± r3 ,± 2r3 ,±r], and vˆ is a selected unit-length directional vector. For each selected
direction, we generate six samples within C along both the positive and the negative directions to
ensure efficiency and even sampling. Here, we propose two different methods to sample directional
vectors:
• random: Random sampling is the simplest and most efficient method that one can come up
with. We fill the directional vectors with random numbers generated from a standard normal
distribution, and then normalize them to have unit length.
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• approx: Instead of using random directions, it would be much more efficient to move out
of the original region if we use the normal directions of the closest hyperplanes. In ReLU
neural networks, each hidden node represents a hyperplane in the input space. For any
input x, the distance to each hyperplane may be computed as d(n)k =
a
(n)
k
‖vˆ(n)k ‖
, where a(n)k
denotes the output of the corresponding hidden node and vˆ(n)k = ∇xa(n)k . Based on all
distances computed for all hidden nodes, we can select the normal directions for the K
closest hyperplanes. However, computing the exact distances is computationally expensive
as it requires back-propagation for all hidden nodes. In implementation, we simply estimate
relative distances among all hidden units in the same layer using the weights matrix of this
layer and select some closest hidden units in each layer based on the relative distances. In
this way, we only need to back-propagate for the selected units. We refer this implementation
as "approx" in the experimental results.
4 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the above post-averaging method to defend against several popular
adversarial attacking methods on the challenging ImageNet task.
4.1 Experimental setup
• Dataset: Since our proposed post-averaging method does not need to re-train neural net-
works, we do not need to use any training data in our experiments. For the evaluation
purpose, we use the validation set of the ImageNet task (Russakovsky et al., 2015). The
validation set consists of 50000 images labelled into 1000 categories. Following settings
in (Prakash et al., 2018; Liao et al., 2017; Xie et al., 2017; Athalye et al., 2018), for compu-
tational efficiency, we randomly choose 5000 images from the ImageNet validation set and
evaluate our approach on these 5000 images.
• Target model: We use a pre-trained VGG16 network (Simonyan and Zisserman, 2014) with
batch normalization that is available from PyTorch. In our experiments, we directly use this
pre-trained model without any modification.
• Source of adversarial attacking methods: We use Foolbox (Rauber et al., 2017), an open
source tool box to generate adversarial samples using different adversarial attacking methods.
In this work, we have chosen four most popular attacking methods used in the literature: Fast
Gradient Sign method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2014), Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)
method (Kurakin et al., 2016; Madry et al., 2017), DeepFool (DF) attack method (Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2016) and Carlini & Wagner (C&W) L2 attack method (Carlini and Wagner,
2017a).
• Threat model: Inspired by (Yuan et al., 2019; Carlini et al., 2019), we adopt the commonly
assumed threat model that: the adversarial can only attack during testing and they have
complete knowledge of the target model. We also constrain the allowed perturbations by l∞
norm  = 8/255.
4.2 Evaluation criteria
For each experiment, we define:
• Clean set: The dataset that consists of the 5000 images randomly sampled from ImageNet.
• Attacked set: For every correctly classified image in the Clean set, if an adversarial sample
is successfully generated under the attacking criteria, the original sample is replaced with
the adversarial sample; if no adversarial sample is found, the original sample is kept in the
dataset. Meanwhile, all the misclassified images are kept in the dataset without any change.
Therefore the dataset also has 5000 images.
In our experiments, we evaluate the original model and the model defended using post-averaging on
both the Clean and the Attacked sets. The performance is measured in terms of :
• Accuracy: number of correctly classified images over the whole dataset.
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Table 1: Performance of post-averaging against different top-1-miss attacking methods on ImageNet
( = 8/255, r = 30, and K = 60).
Original Model Defended by Post-Averaging
Top-1 Accuracy Top-1 Accuracy Defence
attack, defence Clean Attacked Clean Attacked Rate #Adv
FGSM, random 0.7252 0.0224 0.7192 0.6958 0.9363 3514FGSM, approx 0.6786 0.6388 0.8372
PGD, random 0.7252 0.0010 0.7190 0.7048 0.9508 3621PGD, approx 0.6786 0.6540 0.8630
DF, random 0.7252 0.0120 0.7180 0.7052 0.9521 3571DF, approx 0.6786 0.6578 0.8681
C&W, random 0.7252 0.0012 0.7188 0.7064 0.9533 3620C&W, approx 0.6786 0.6600 0.8713
Table 2: Performance of post-averaging on the sizes of used neighborhood ( = 8/255, K = 60).
Original Model Defended by Post-Averaging
Top-1 Accuracy Top-1 Accuracy Defence
attack, defence Clean Attacked Clean Attacked Rate #Adv
FGSM, random(r=4)
0.7252 0.0224
0.7238 0.4888 0.6614
3514FGSM, random(r=15) 0.7242 0.6860 0.9303
FGSM, random(r=30) 0.7192 0.6958 0.9363
FGSM, approx(r=4)
0.7252 0.0224
0.7246 0.6534 0.8739
3514FGSM, approx(r=15) 0.7056 0.6534 0.8617
FGSM, approx(r=30) 0.6786 0.6388 0.8372
• Defence rate: number of successfully defended adversarial samples over the total number
of adversarial samples in the Attacked set. By "successfully defended", it refers to the case
where an adversarial sample is correctly classified after the original model is defended by
the post-averaging approach.
4.3 Experimental results on top-1-miss criterion
In the experiments reported in this subsection, we generated adversarial samples based on the top-1-
miss criterion, which defines adversarial samples as images whose predicted classes are not the same
as their true labels.
Table 1 shows the performance of our defence approach against different attacking methods. In
this table, the samples for post-averaging are selected within an n-sphere of radius r = 30 as in
eq.(8), with K = 60 different directions. For the approx sampling method, we select 20 directional
vectors from each of the last three fully-connected layers in the original VGG16 model, while for
random sampling we simply randomly generate 60 different directions. Both methods result in a total
of 60 × 2 × 3 + 1 = 361 samples (including the input) for each input image to be used in eq.(7).
Moreover, all the adversarial samples generated are restricted to be within the perturbation range
 = 8/255. We show the top-1 accuracy of the original model and the defended model on both the
Clean and the Attacked set respectively, as well as the defence rate of the defended model. Besides,
we also show the number of adversarial samples successfully generated by each attacking method in
the last column.
From Table 1, we can see that our proposed defence approach is universally robust to all of the
attacking methods we have examined. It has achieved about 85% defence rates in all the experiments
with only a minor performance degradation in the Clean set. Especially when using the random
sampling method, our method can defend about 95% adversarial samples while having very little
performance degradation in the Clean set (less than 1%). This is due to random sampling can provide
more evenly distributed sampling directions than approx sampling when the neighborhood is large
enough (r = 30).
However, when the used neighborhood is small, we may anticipate that random sampling may be
more sensitive to the neighborhood size r. In this case, the randomly sampled directions are usually
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Table 3: Performance of post-averaging on the number of sampling directions ( = 8/255, r = 30).
Original Model Defended by Post-Averaging
Top-1 Accuracy Top-1 Accuracy Defence
attack, defence Clean Attacked Clean Attacked Rate #Adv
FGSM, random(K=6)
0.7252 0.0224
0.7180 0.6944 0.9351
3514FGSM, random(K=15) 0.7194 0.6948 0.9351
FGSM, random(K=60) 0.7192 0.6958 0.9363
FGSM, approx(K=6)
0.7252 0.0224
0.6754 0.6128 0.7999
3514FGSM, approx(K=15) 0.6802 0.6280 0.8190
FGSM, approx(K=60) 0.6786 0.6388 0.8372
Table 4: Performance of post-averaging against different top-5-miss attacking methods on ImageNet
( = 8/255, r = 30, and K = 60).
Original Model Defended by Post-Averaging
Top-1 Accuracy Top-5 Accuracy Top-1 Accuracy Top-5 Accuracy Defence
attack,defence Clean Attacked Clean Attacked Clean Attacked Clean Attacked Rate #Adv
FGSM, random 0.7252 0.1306 0.9136 0.1544 0.7184 0.3436 0.9106 0.8892 0.9565 3796FGSM, approx 0.6786 0.3874 0.8856 0.7914 0.8177
PGD, random 0.7252 0.0074 0.9136 0.0096 0.7190 0.3172 0.9112 0.9014 0.9768 4520PGD, approx 0.6786 0.3902 0.8856 0.8290 0.8883
DF, random 0.7252 0.0454 0.9136 0.0534 0.7180 0.5006 0.9110 0.9034 0.9788 4301DF, approx 0.6786 0.5528 0.8856 0.8642 0.9247
C&W, random 0.7252 0.1116 0.9136 0.3000 0.7196 0.3214 0.9116 0.9054 0.9889 3068C&W, approx 0.6786 0.4294 0.8856 0.8458 0.9263
not the normal directions of the closest hyperplanes so that small radius may not be sufficient to
move out the current region. To investigate this problem, we have tested both sampling methods
on 3 different radii. Experimental results are shown in Table 2. As we can see, the defence rates
drop significantly from 94% to 66% for random sampling when a smaller radius is used while for
approx sampling it can even get slight performance improvement when a smaller radius is used.
Therefore, we recommend to use relatively larger radii for random sampling and relatively smaller
radii for approx sampling. Moreover, we may improve and stabilize the performance by combining
two methods with an ensemble model, which will be left for future investigation.
At the end, we have also investigated the effect on performance when using different numbers
of sampling directions. As shown in Table 3, the defence performance doesn’t vary much when
much less sampling directions are used. For example, our defence approach still retains very good
performance even when K = 6 is used, in which only 6× 2× 3 + 1 = 37 samples are evaluated for
each input image. These samples can be easily packed into a mini-batch for very fast computation in
GPUs. Hence when time efficiency is a concern, we can significantly reduce the number of sampling
directions for faster defensive evaluation.
4.4 Experimental results on top-5-miss criterion
For image classification on the ImageNet task, it is usually more reasonable to use top-5 accuracy due
to large number of confusing classes and multi-label cases, in this subsection, we have also evaluated
our defence approach against adversarial samples that are generated based on the top-5-miss criterion.
Under the top-5-miss criterion, adversarial samples are defined as images whose true labels are
not among their top 5 predictions. Note that although the adversarial samples are easier to defend
under the top-5-miss criterion, the adversarial samples generated are actually much stronger since the
true labels are pushed out of the top-5 predictions. Experimental results are shown in Table 4. As
shown in the table, our defence approach using random sampling can achieve over 97% defence rates
against all four attacking methods. Meanwhile, when measured by top-5 accuracy, we can see that
the defended models using random sampling yield almost no performance degradation in the Clean
set and achieves only a small performance degradation (about 1-3%) in the Attacked set.
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5 Final remarks
In this paper, we have presented some theoretical results on Fourier analysis of ReLU neural networks.
These results are useful for us to understand why neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial samples.
As a possible defence strategy, we have proposed a simple post-averaging method. Experimental
results on ImageNet have demonstrated that our simple defence technique turns to be very effective
against many popular attack methods in the literature. Finally, it will be interesting to see whether
our post-averaging method will be still robust against any new attack methods in the future.
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Appendix: Mathematical proofs
Definition 2.1. A piece-wise linear function is a continuous function f : Rn −→ R such that there
are some hyperplanes passing through origin and dividing Rn into M pairwise disjoint regions Rm,
(m = 1, 2, ...,M), on each of which f is linear:
f(x) =

w1 · x x ∈ R1
w2 · x x ∈ R2
...
wM · x x ∈ RM
Lemma 2.2. Composition of a piece-wise linear function with a ReLU activation function is also a
piece-wise linear function.
Proof. Let r(.) denote the ReLU activation function. If f(x) on region Rm takes both positive and
negative values, r
(
f(x)
)
will break it into two regions R+p and R
0
p. On the former r
(
f(x)
)
= f(x)
and on the latter r
(
f(x)
)
= 0, which both are linear functions. As f(x) on Rp is linear, common
boundary of R+p and R
0
p lies inside a hyperplane passing through origin – which is the kernel of the
linear function. Therefore, if f(x) is a piece-wise linear function defined by k hyperplanes resulting
inM regions, r
(
f(x)
)
will be a piece-wise linear function defined by at most k+m hyperplanes.
Theorem 2.3. The output of any hidden unit in an unbiased fully-connected ReLU neural network is
a piece-wise linear function.
Proof. This proposition immediately follows lemma 2.2.
Definition 2.4. LetV = {v1,v2, ...,vn} be a set of n independent vectors inRn. An infinite simplex,
R+V, is defined as the region linearly spanned by V using only positive weights:
R+V = {
n∑
k=1
αkvk | ∀k αk > 0} (9)
Theorem 2.5. Each piece-wise linear function f(x) can be formulated as a summation of some
functions: f(x) =
∑K
k=1 fk(x), each of which is linear and non-zero only in an infinite simplex as
follows:
fk(x) =
{
wk · x x ∈ R+Vk
0 otherwise
where Vk is a set of n independent vectors, and wk is a weight vector.
Proof. Each region Rp of a piece-wise linear function, f(x), which describes the behavior of a ReLU
node if intersects with an affine hyper-plane results in a convex polytope. This convex polytope can
be triangulated into some simplices. Define Vk, (k = 1, 2, ...,K), sets of vertexes of these simplices.
The infinite simplexes created by these vector sets will have the desired property and f(x) can be
written as: f(x) =
∑K
k=1 fk(x).
As explained earlier in the original article by adding n2 hyper-planes to those defining the piece-wise
linear function, the output of a ReLU node may be represented as f(x) =
∑Q
q=1 gq(x). These
hyper-planes are those perpendicular to standard basis vectors and subtraction of one of these vectors
from another one. That is, ei (i = 1, . . . , n) and ei − ej (1 ≤ i < j ≤ n). Given this representation,
the final step to achieve the Fourier transform is the following lemma:
Lemma 2.6. Fourier transform of the following function:
s(x) =
{
h(1− 1 · x) x ∈ R+V∗
0 otherwise
12
may be presented as:
S(ω) =
( −i√
2pi
)n n∑
r=0
e−iωr∏
r′ 6=r
(ωr′ − ωr) (10)
where ωr is the rth component of frequency vector ω (r = 1, · · · , n), and ω0 = 0.
Proof. Alternatively, s(x) may be represented as:
s(x) = h(1 · x)h(1− 1 · x)
n∏
j=1
h(xj)h(1− xj) (11)
Therefore, we need to compute Fourier transform of h(x)h(1− x):
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−ixωh(x)(1− x)dx = 1√
2pi
∫ 1
0
e−ixωdx (12)
=
−i√
2pi
1− e−iω
ω
(13)
By taking the inverse Fourier transform of the function:
(
√
2pi)n−1
∫ ∞
−∞
−i√
2pi
1− e−iζ
ζ
δn(ω − ζ1) dζ (14)
where δn is n-dimensional Dirac Delta function, it can be shown that it is the Fourier transform of
h(1 · x)h(1− 1 · x):
(
1√
2pi
)n
∫
· · ·
∫
Rn
eiω.x(
√
2pi)n−1
∫ ∞
−∞
−i√
2pi
1− e−iζ
ζ
δn(ω − ζ1) dζ dω (15)
=
1√
2pi
∫
· · ·
∫
Rn
eiω.x
∫ ∞
−∞
−i√
2pi
1− e−iζ
ζ
δn(ω − ζ1) dζ dω (16)
=
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
−i√
2pi
1− e−iζ
ζ
∫
· · ·
∫
Rn
eiω.xδn(ω − ζ1) dω dζ (17)
=
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
−i√
2pi
1− e−iζ
ζ
eiζ1.x dζ (18)
= h(1 · x)h(1− 1 · x) (19)
Now we can find the Fourier transform of s(x)
S(ω) =
( n∏
r=1
−i√
2pi
1− e−iωr
ωr
) ∗ (√2pi)n−1 ∫ ∞
−∞
−i√
2pi
1− e−iζ
ζ
δn(ω − ζ1) dζ (20)
= i(
−i√
2pi
)n+2
∫ ∞
−∞
e−iζ
n∏
r=0
1− e−i(ωr−ζ)
ωr − ζ dζ (21)
where ∗ is convolution operator. The final integrand may be represented as:
e−iζ
n∏
r=0
1− e−i(ωr−ζ)
ωr − ζ = e
−iζ
n∏
r=0
1
ωr − ζ
n∏
r=0
(1− e−i(ωr−ζ)) (22)
= e−iζ
n∑
r=0
Ar
ωr − ζ
n∏
r=0
(1− e−i(ωr−ζ)) (23)
= e−iζ
n∑
r=0
Ar
ωr − ζ
∑
B⊆Ω
(−1)|B|e−i(σB−|B|ζ) (24)
=
n∑
r=0
Ar
ωr − ζ
∑
B⊆Ω
(−1)|B|e−i(σB−(|B|−1)ζ) (25)
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where Ω = {ω0, ..., ωn}, σB is the summation over elements of B and Ar =
∏
r′ 6=r
1
ωr′−ωr . Therefore:∫ ∞
−∞
e−iζ
n∏
r=0
1− e−i(ωr−ζ)
ωr − ζ dζ (26)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
n∑
r=0
Ar
ωr − ζ
∑
B⊆S
(−1)|B|e−i(σB−(|B|−1)ζ) dζ (27)
=
n∑
r=0
Ar
∫ ∞
−∞
1
ωr − ζ
∑
B⊆S
(−1)|B|e−i(σB−(|B|−1)ζ) dζ (28)
=
n∑
r=0
Ar
∫ ∞
−∞
1
ζ
∑
B⊆S
(−1)|B|+1e−i(σB−(|B|−1)ωr+(|B|−1)ζ) dζ (29)
=
n∑
r=0
Ar
∑
B⊆S
(−1)|B|ipi sign(|B| − 1)e−i(σB−(|B|−1)ωr) (30)
If B does not contain ωr and have at least 2 elements then the terms for B and B ∪ {ωr} will cancel
each other out. Also, sign(|B| − 1) will vanish if B has only one element. Therefore, there only
remains empty set and sets with two elements one of them being ωr. Given the fact that
∑
Ar = 0,
the result of the integral will be:∫ ∞
−∞
e−iζ
n∏
r=0
1− e−i(ωr−ζ)
ωr − ζ dζ = ipi
n∑
r=0
Ar(−e−iωr +
∑
r′ 6=r
e−iωr′ ) (31)
= −2ipi
n∑
r=0
Are
−iωr (32)
Finally, substituting 32 into 21 yields to the desired result.
Theorem 2.7. The Fourier transform of the output of any hidden node in a fully-connected ReLU
neural network may be represented as
∑Q
q=1wqA
−1
q ∇S(ωA−1q ), where∇ denote the differential
operator.
Proof. As discussed in the original paper, f(x) =
∑Q
q=1 gq(x) where:
gq(x) =
{
w¯q · x¯q h(1− 1 · x¯q) x¯q ∈ R+V∗
0 otherwise (33)
or equivalently:
gq(x) = w¯q · x¯qs(x¯q) (34)
Therefore:
F (ω) =
Q∑
q=1
Gq(ω) (35)
=
Q∑
q=1
w¯q.∇S(ω¯q) (36)
where ω¯q = ωA−1q .
Derivation of eq.(6)
As for the Fourier transform computed in section 3.1, it should be mentioned that the integral in
equation 6 is the Fourier transform of:
hr(x) = h(r − |x|) (37)
14
which can be derived utilizing the property of the Fourier transforms for radially symmetric func-
tions (Stein and Weiss, 1971):
Hr(ω) = |ω|−
n−2
2
∫ ∞
0
Jn−2
2
(|ω|ρ)ρn−22 h(r − ρ)ρ dρ (38)
= |ω|−n−22
∫ r
0
Jn−2
2
(|ω|ρ)ρn2 dρ (39)
= (
r
|ω| )
n
2 Jn
2
(r|ω|) (40)
Given this transform:
FC(ω) = F (ω)
1
VC
∫
· · ·
∫
x′∈C
e−ix
′·ω dx′ (41)
= F (ω)
Γ(n2 + 1)
pi
n
2
Jn
2
(r|ω|)
(r|ω|)n2 (42)
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